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Feb. 17, 1953.]

SUTTER BASIN CORPORATION, LTD. (a Corporation),
Petitioner, v. HANLON BROWN, as County Treasurer,
etc., et al., Respondents.
[1] Reclamation-Bonds.-On the issuance of reclamation district
bonds, a contract is created between the property owners and
the bondholders.
[2] Constitutional Law- Obligation of Contracts- Reclamation
District Bonds.-The laws in existence at the time of issuance
of reclamation district bonds enter into and become a part
of the contract to such an extent that the obligation of the
contract cannot thereafter be impaired or .fulfillment of the
bond obligation hampered or obstructed by a change in such
laws.
[3] !d.-Obligation of Contracts-State and Municipal Contracts.
-The Legislature's power regarding supervision, regulation
and control of conduct of the affairs of irrigation, reclamation
and drainage districts is plenary as to all governmental affairs,
including procedure and administration, limited only where it
tends to impair the obligation of a contract; such plenary
power does not extend to and include the right of the Legislature to trench on private rights arising out of or based on
contracts.
[4] Reclamation- Bonds- Payment.- The time and method of
payment of reclamation district bonds, as well as the nature
of the security given the bondholders, are integral parts of
the landowner-bondholder contract.
[5] Id.-Bonds-Payment.-Where refunding bonds were issued
by a reclamation district under the provisions of Pol. Code,
§ 3480, as that section read in 1930, in accordance with which
the landowners agreed to pay whatever was necessary to meet
the principal and interest maturities after crediting thereon
the funds in the county treasury applicable to such payment,
retroactive effect may not be given to the 1949 amendment
of such code section (now Wat. Code, § 51420) which requires the county treasurer to exclude from the bond fund
any monies obtained from sale and rental of lands, accelerates
[2] See Cal.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 158 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Constitutional Law, § 399 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 6] Reclamation, § 86(1); [2, 3] Constitutional Law, §135; [4,5,10] Reclamation, §86(4); [7,9] Reclamation § 62; [8] Reclamation, § 60.5; [11, 12] Constitutional
Law, § 138; [13] Reclamation, §SO; [14] Constitutional Law, §55.
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the time of payment on the bonds and gives additional security to the bondholders, since such changes, if applied to these
bonds, are impairments of the contract of the landowners
contrary to constitutional guarantees.
[6] !d.-Bonds-Trust Funds.-Pol. Code,§ 3480, relating to bonds
of reclamation districts, created a trust fund for the benefit
of bondholders which consists of money received on installment calls, from the sale of land on account of delinquencies
or from the resale of land purchased by the county treasurer,
and also all unsold land bought by him to satisfy delinquencies.
[7] Id.-Assessments-Liens.-The nature of the burden which
the levy of an assessment of a reclamation district places
on a landowner must be measured by the terms of the statute
creating the assessment, and where, at the time the assessment was levied, it was expressly made a lien on the land
against which it was levied (Pol. Code, § 3463; now W at.
Code, § 51256), such assessment was to be paid in separate
installments as the board of trustees in its discretion may
direct (Pol. Code, § 3466; now Wat. Code, § 51517), and,
when bonds were issued, the assessment became security for
their payment (Pol. Code, §§ 3480, 3480a; now Wat. Code,
§ 51257), the obligation of the landowner cannot thereafter
be increased or lessened.
[8] !d.-Assessments-Additional Assessments.-Provisions for
additional assessments of a reclamation district, as found in
Pol. Code, § 3480 (now Wat. Code, §§ 51300-51302) that the
"lien of any unpaid assessment upon which bonds shall have
been issued shall continue until all said bonds . . . shall have
been paid in full except as hereinafter provided in reference
to the use of bonds as payment of assessments," and for
supplemental assessments in the event any of the bonds remain unpaid after enforcement of the assessment, do not
necessarily imply that the assessment will be extinguished
as the bonds are retired, but make certain that it will continue until all outstanding bonds are paid.
[9] Id.-Assessments-Lien-Discharge.-Code sections such as
Pol. Code, § 3480a (now Wat. Code, § 51651), permitting
discharge of lien of assessment of reclamation district when
outstanding bonds are surrendered, indicate a legislative intent to make the assessment coextensive only with the collection of funds necessary to finance the improvement for
which the assessment was levied.
[10] Id.-Bonds-Payment.-The application of money available
for payment of reclamation district bonds in the manner
directed by Pol. Code, § 3480, as that section read in 1930
when the bonds were issued, would not be a gift of public
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funds to a private person in violation of Const., art. IV,
~ 31, since such money is not the property of the state or
of the district, but is part of a trust fund for benefit of the
bondholders.
[11] Constitutional Law-Equal Protection of Laws.-The equality
guaranteed by the Constitution is an equality of right and
not of enjoyment.
[12] Id.-Equal Protection of Laws.-A law that confers equal
rights on all citizens or subjects them to equal burdens is
an equal law, and so long as the statute does not permit one
to exercise the privilege while refusing it to another of like
qualifications, it is unobjectionable.
[13] Reclamation- Assessments- Proceedings to Enforce- Defenses.-In mandamus proceeding to compel county treasurer
to cancel a call for payment of reclamation district bonds
and to estimate funds available for payment of such bonds
in the manner directed by Pol. Code, § 3480, as that section
read in 1930 when the bonds were issued, it is no defense
that the landowners electing to pay calls for assessments
as they were made, rather than the landowners electing to
discharge their liens by surrendering bonds purchased at a
discount, benefited as a result of increase in land values following a depression, since "theirs was the greater risk, and
theirs was the greater gain," and the writ need not therefore
be denied to prevent an inequity.
[14] Constitutional Law- Raising Constitutional QuestionsWaiver.-Right of landowner in reclamation district to raise
constitutional question of impairment of contract posed by
1949 amendment of Pol. Code, § 3480 (now Wat. Code,
§ 51420), requiring county treasurer to exclude from bond
fund any monies therein obtained from sale and rental of
lands, is not waived, although landowner's counsel appeared
before legislative committees and advocated adoption of such
amendment, where he appeared in connection with proposed
procedure in regard to sale of delinquent bonds and did not
advocate exclusion from the treasurer's estimates of any
money in the bond fund.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel county treasurer to
cancel a call for a bond assessment on land in a reclamation
district, and to direct him to estimate amount of instalment
due on such assessment. Writ granted.
[11] See Cal.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 175; Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 468 et seq.
[14] See Cal.Jur., Constitutional Law, §55; Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 120.
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Wright & Garrett, Alfred Wright and David M. Harney
for Petitioner.
Loyd E. Hewitt, District Attorney (Sutter), Bruce F.
Allen, Stephen W. Downey and Downey, Brand, Seymour
& Rohwer for Respondents.
EDMONDS, J.-The Treasurer of Sutter County has made
a call upon the owners of lands in Reclamation District No.
1500 for the payment of certain sums estimated in accordance
with section 3480 of the Political Code, 1 as amended in 1949.
His estimate includes the amounts of the installments of interest and of principal due January 1, 1950, upon a series
of refunding bonds issued in 1930. The amendment of 1949
excludes from the estimate to be made by a county treasurer
all amounts in a district's bond fund which were derived
from the rentals or sales of lands sold to him to satisfy delinquencies in payment of calls. By writ of mandate, Sutter
Basin Corporation, a landowner in the district, seeks to compel the treasurer to cancel his present call, and to estimate
the funds available for payment of the bonds in the manner
directed by section 3480 as it read when the bonds were issued. The question for decision is whether the 1949 legislation applies to bonds issued prior to its effective date.
The facts have been presented by stipulation.
Reclamation District No. 1500 lies wholly within Sutter
County. In 1919, Assessment No. 1, apportioned among the
landowners in accordance with ''special benefits'' (Pol. Code,
§ 3456), 2 was levied by the district upon all the lands within
its boundaries. One year later, bonds were issued in the
approximate amount unpaid upon the assessment. In 1930,
these bonds were in default and refunding bonds were issued
as provided by section 3480a of the Political Code. 3 The new
obligations, maturing serially between 1941 and 1962, were
in the principal amount of about $4,750,000.
Except for the amendment of 1949, since 1930 there has
been no change in the statutory provisions governing the
payment of bonds of reclamation districts insofar as the rights
1
In 1951, the Legislature reenacted the provisions of the Political Code
governing reclamation districts as division 15 of the Water Code. (Stats.
1951, ch. 336, pp. 690-769.) The requirements of former section 3480
of the Political Code, insofar as they apply to the present proceeding,
are now found in sections 51420 to 51425 of the Water Code.
"Now Wat. Code, §§ 51231, 51236.
"Now Wat. Code, §§ 52500-52602.
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of the parties in the present proceeding are concerned. Such
bonds are payable from a bond fund, of which the treasurer
of the "main county in which the district is located" is the
trustee. To the extent that the bond fund is insufficient to
pay installments due upon the bonds, the treasurer is directed
to make a call upon each landowner in proportion to the
amount of his unpaid assessment. (Pol. Code, § 3480.) 4 If
a property owner becomes delinquent in the payment of a
call, his land must be sold at public auction and the proceeds
deposited in the bond fund. (Pol. Code, § 3480.) 5 An upset
price is fixed equal to the sum of the delinquency, plus a
penalty and interest. If, at public auction, no bid equal to
that sum is received, the treasurer, as trustee of the bond
fund, is required to bid the amount of the upset price and
the land is sold to him.
Prior to 1931, the treasurer could not resell such lands
at less than the upset price. Due to the then existing depression in economic conditions, the upset price generally was
more than the value of the land. For that reason, large areas
of land sold to the treasurer to satisfy delinquencies could not
be disposed of by him. To permit their restoration to private
ownership, section 3466a of the Political Code, 6 enacted in
that year, authorized the sale of such lands at their fair
market value, regardless of the statutory upset price. It
also permitted the lands to be rented, the proceeds to be
deposited in the bond fund. Despite the new provision, the
lands to which the treasurer of Reclamation District No.
1500 held title remained unsold, placing added burdens on
the remaining landowners of the district. No taxes were
paid on delinquent lands, and calls to satisfy installments due
upon the bonds were not met.
In 1949, section 3466a was amended to make mandatory
the sale of such lands within prescribed time limits. (Stats.
1949, ch. 719.) 7 The treasurer sold all of the lands in Reclamation District No. 1500 upon which there were delinquent
assessments and deposited the proceeds in the bond fund.
Including the proceeds from such sales and from crop rentals,
there is now $710,000 in that fund, and a resolution would
be sufficient to transfer to it $160,000 which the district has
'Wat. Code, §§ 51420-51425.
"Wat. Code, §§ 51630-51651.
"Wat. Code, §§ 51680-51695, 51750-51757.
7
See Wat. Code, § 51680.
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in its general fund. The outstanding bonds are in the principal sum of $559,500. Interest computed to maturity amounts
to $263,745. If and when the cash in the general fund is
transferred, there would be in the bond fund more than
enough money to pay principal and interest of the bonds in
full.
By the same statute, however, section 3480 of the Political
Code 8 was amended to read in part as follows :
''At least ninety days before any interest day of the bonds,
including refunding bonds, the county treasurer of the main
county shall estimate the amount of money necessary to pay
interest and principal maturing on such interest date after
crediting thereon the funds in the treasury applicable to the
payment thereof, excluding therefrom any funds in the
treasury deposited therein purstwnt to Section 3466a of this
code or derived from the sale of lancls by the county treasurer
as trustee of the district under the provisions of this section
or Sections 3466a and 3480a of this cocle and the expenses of
the county treasurer hereinafter proviclecl and shall add thereto
15 per cent of such aggregate to cover possible delinquencies.
. . . " (Emphasis added to the amended portion.)
The treasurer estimated that on January 1, 1950, $16,785
would be due on account of interest and $8,000 on the principal of the outstanding bonds. Acting under the 1949
amendment, he issued a call for $24,895, plus the statutory
amount to cover possible delinquencies, to owners of land
subject to the 1919 assessment. Sutter Basin Corporation
was notified that it must pay, as its share of the call, $13,757.
The position of the petitioner in justification of the present
proceeding is that a retroactive application of the 1949 amendment, so as to exclude from the bond fund the proceeds from
the resale of delinquent lands and crop rentals, will impair
the obligation of the contract existing between the bondholders and the landowners of the district. So applied, it iR
argued, the amendment will change the time and method of
payment and give the bondholders additional security.
The treasurer replies that the power of the Legislature
over reclamation districts is plenary, and cannot be circumscribed. Furthermore, the amendment provides no benefit to
the bondholders, and, without such benefit, there can be no
impairment of contract. The funds derived from sales and
rentals of delinquent lands result from section 3466a 9 of the
"Now Wat. Code, § 51420.
"Now Wat. Code, §§ 51680-51695, 51750-51757.
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Political Code, which was enacted subsequent to the refunding
bond issue. Nor is there a detriment to the landowners, for
the amendment merely enforces their duty to pay their assessments, which has always existed. To hold otherwise would
violate numerous provisions of the state and federal Constitutions.
Another contention of the treasurer is that issuance of a
writ of mandate would be inequitable. Finally, he asserts,
Sutter Basin Corporation has consented to and acquiesced in
the amendment by advocating the adoption of the 1949 statute
in appearances before both houses of the Legislature, and,
therefore, it has waived its right to object to the amendment.
[1] It cannot be questioned that, upon issuance of the
bonds, a contract was created between the property owners and
the bondholders. (Islais Co. v. Matheson, 3 Cal.2d 657, 662
[45 P.2d 326]; County of Los Angeles v. Rockhold, 3 Cal.2d
192, 200 [44 P.2d 340, 100 A.J_~.R. 149]; County of San Diego
v. Childs, 217 Cal. 109, 120 [17 P.2d 734]; Copeland v. Raub,
36 Cal.App.2d 441, 447 [97 P.2d 859]; River Farms Co. v.
Gibson, 4 Cal.App.2d 731, 749 [42 P.2d 95] ; Hershey v. Cole,
130 Cal.App. 683, 695 [20 P.2d 972] .) [2] The laws in
existence at that time, under the authority of which the bonds
were issued, ''. . . enter into and become a part of the contract to such extent that the obligation of the contract cannot
thereafter be impaired or fulfillment of the bond obligation
lwmpered or obstructed by a change in such laws." (County
of San Bernardino v. Wa.y, 18 Cal.2d 647,661 [117 P.2d 354].)
[3] The treasurer's contention that legislation in regard
to reclamation districts is within the plenary power of the
state, and cannot be challenged by a landowner of the district,
is answered in He1·shey v. Cole, 130 Cal.App. 683 [20 P.2d
072 J. The court said : ''The supervision, the regulation and
the controlling of the conduct of the affairs of irrigation,
reel amation and drainage districts is plenary as to all governmental affairs, including procedure and administration,
limited only where it tends to impair the obligation of a
contract. In other words, the plenary power does not extend to
and include the right of the legislature to trench upon private
rights arising out of or based upon contracts." (P. 687.)
[ 4] rrhe time and method of payment, as well as the nature
of the security given the bondholders, are integral parts of
the landowner-bondholder contract. (Shouse v. Quinley, 3
Cal.2d 357, 361 [ 45 P.2d 701] ; County of Los Angeles v. Rockhold, 3 Cal.2d 192, 210 [44 P.2d 340, 100 A.L.R. 149] ; Security
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Trust & Sav. Bank v. City of Los Angeles, 120 Cal.App. 518, 524
[7 P.2d 1061] .) Sutter Basin Corporation contends that the
1949 amendment impairs each of these aspects of its contract.
As section 3480 of the Political Code read in 1930, when
the refunding bonds were issued, the bond fund was to consist
of all amounts collected by the treasurer upon assessment calls,
and also from either the sale of delinquent ~ands or their
redemption, as well as the proceeds of the resale of lands
purchased by him at sales to satisfy delinquent calls. Such
funds were to be used exclusively for the payment of principal
and interest on outstanding bonds. Each year the treasurer
was required to estimate the amount of money necessary to
pay maturing interest and principal, ''crediting thereon the
funds in the treasury applicable to the payment thereof" and
thereafter to issue a call to the owners of lands subject to
the assessment for the balance, adding thereto 15 per cent to
cover possible delinquencies. The obligation of each landowner was to pay the portion of the balance represented
by his unpaid assessment, plus an additional amount to cover
possible delinquencies.
[5] According to the 1949 amendment, the treasurer must
exclude from his estimate a portion of the moneys in the bond
fund formerly available for bond payments. Necessarily, if
the statute is to be applied as construed by him, an additional
burden of payment is placed upon the landowners. Moreover,
the time at which the landowner must make payment is accelerated. If the amounts sought to be excluded by the 1949
amendment may be used to pay the current installment due
upon the bonds, there is no necessity for landowners to pay
the present call. The amendment also changes the order of
payment. By its terms, the treasurer must collect calls from
landowners before certain money in the bond fund may be
used. Formerly, he was to call upon all such funds first.
These changes, if applied to bonds issued prior to the effective
date of the amendment, are impairments of the contract of the
landowners contrary to constitutional guarantees. ( Cf. Shouse
v. Quinley, 3 Cal.2d 357, 360-361 [45 P.2d 701]; Mulcahy v.
Baldwin, 216 Cal. 517, 525 [15 P.2d 738]; Copeland v. Raub,
36 Cal.App.2d 441, 447 [97 P.2d 859]; Hershey v. Cole, 130
Cal.App. 683, 701 [20 P.2d 972] .)
The retroactive application of the 1949 amendment would
impair the obligations of the landowner-bondowner contract in still another manner. By sections 3480 and 3480a of
the Political Code, the lien of the assessment is made security
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for the payment of the bonds. 10 Through the trustee of the
bond fund, the bondholders may enforce their right to payment by a sale of land upon which a call has become delinquent. Prior to the amendment, the proceeds from such
sales, or from the resale or rentals of delinquent lands, were
required to be immediately applied to bond payments. Section
0480 of the Political Code 11 provides that they may be used
for no other purpose. By directing the county treasurer to
exclude such funds from his estimate, the amendment forces
him to keep them intact. 'l'he bondholders are thus given a
fund which must be held in reserve for their benefit in addition
to the security of the assessment, thereby increasing their
security.
'l'he treasurer, however, argues that the landowners have
no rights in the exeluded funds, because the money was not
paid to him pursuant to the statutory provisions which were
a part of the 1930 contract. He correctly points out that
the 1949 amendment excludes from credit in the computation
of calls any amount in the treasury ''deposited therein pursuant to Seetion 3466a of this code or derived from the sale of
lands by the county treasurer as trustee of the district under
the provisions of this section or Sections 3466a and 3480a of
this code . . . . " Specifically, says the treasurer, the only
money excluded by the challenged computation is either the
purchase price of delinquent land or crop rental derived by
virtue of section 3466a, which was not enacted until 1931, a
year after the bonds were issued. 12
[6] This argument was conclusively answered by the decision in River Farms Co. v. Gibson, 4 Cal..App.2d 731 [ 42
P.2d 95]. In speaking of section 3466a, it was there said:
''That the lands purchased by the county treasurer and deeded
to himself as trustee either of the bond fund or for the benefit
of tlle district, constitute a trust for the benefit of the bondholders, seems to us explicitly stated in the terms used in
section 3480, s~tpra, as it originally read and as it now stands
amended. All moneys collected by the treasurer, whether on
account of installment, penalties, interest or sale of lands,
must be by him paid into the treasury for the benefit of the
bondholders." (P. 744.) In essence, the court held that sec10

See Wat. Code, § 51257.

11

Cf. Wat. Code, §§ 51238, 51643.

12
Stats. 1931, ch. 317, p. 773; now Wat. Code, §§ 51680-51695, 5175051757.
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tion 3480 ereated a trust fund for the benefit of bondholders
which eonsists of money rPeeived on installment calls, from
the sale of land on account of delinqucneies, or from the resale
of land purehased by the treasurer, and also all unsold land
bought by him to satisfy delinquencies.
Concerning the money derived from the lease or operation
of unsold lands of the distriet, it was said: '' 'rhat the rents,
issues and profits derived from trust properties follow the
cor-p1[S and beeome a part of the trust funds is unquestioned,
irrespeetive of the act of the legislature adding section
3466 (a), supra, providing for the management of property, the
title to which has beeome vested in the county treasurer for
the benefit of the distriet, and the specifying therein of the
applieation to be made of rents, issues and profits." (P. 755.)
The treasurer argues that there is no increased burden upon
the landowner, because the amendment merely provides a
method of discharging the obligation of the assessment. His
position is that the assessment is a fixed liability.
[7] The nature of the burden whieh the levy of an assessment plaees upon the landowner must be measured by the
terms of the statute ereating the assessment. (Ryan v. Byram,
4 Cal.2d 596, 606 [51 P.2d 872]; Flinn v. Zerbe, 40 Cal.App.
294, 296 [180 P. 650] ; Abrams v. San Francisco, 48 Cal.App.
2d 1, 6 [119 P.2d 197] .) In 1919, when Assessment No. 1 was
levied, it was expressly made a lien upon the land against
which it was levied. (Pol. Code, § 3463.) 13 Such assessment
was to be paid ''in separate installments, of such amounts,
and at such times, respeetively, as the [board of trustees],
from time to time, in its diseretion by order entered in its
minutes may direet." (Pol. Code, § 3466.) 14 \Vhen bonds
were issued, the assessment beeame seeurity for their payment. (Pol. Code, §§ 3480, 3480a.) 15 Thereafter, the obligation
of the property owner was measured by the statutory provisions applicable to payment. "His obligations eannot be inereased or lessened. The portion of the assessment, or rather,
the amount of the installment that is to be paid by the land
owner at each annual period is fixed when the contract is
eompleted, by the sale of the bonds." (Hershey v. Cole, 130
Cal.App. 683, 689-700 [20 P.2d 972] .)
The treasurer contends that if the "credit provisions" of
section 3480, as it read when the bonds were issued, are
18

Now Wat. Code, § 51256.
Now Wat. Code, § 51517.
15
Now Wat. Code, § 51257.

14
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"held to require the purchase price and rentals of the delinquent lands in the bond fund to be credited against the
bond calls as contended for by petitioner then, under the
facts of this case, and the law as so construed and applied
there would be clear violation of numerous provisions of both
the federal and state constitutions.'' This argument is based
upon the assumption that if all of the moneyin the bond fund
is used to discharge the outstanding bonds, Sutter Basin Corporation and other landowners may never have to pay the
assessment outstanding against their lands.
Bearing upon this issue is the paragraph entitled "Additional assessment,'' found in section 3480 of the Political
Code. 16 It reads : "The lien of any unpaid assessment upon
which bonds shall have been issued shall continue until all
said bonds, and any refunding bonds which may be issued,
shall have been paid in full except as hereinafter provided
in reference to the use of bonds as payment of assessments
. . . '' The section also authorizes supplemental assessments
in the event any of the bonds remain unpaid after the enforcement of the assessment.
[8] These provisions do not necessarily imply that the
assessment will be extinguished as the bonds are retired but
make certain that it will continue until all outstanding bonds
are paid. However, section 3456 17 requires all money derived
from calls on the assessment to be set ''apart as a separate
fund for the purpose of paying the principal and interest
of such bonds,'' and that no part of such money shall be
used for any other purpose. There is no provision for making a call upon the assessment after all bonds have been
retired; the only statutory authority for a call is to "pay interest and principal maturing on such interest date." (Pol.
Code, § 3480.) 18 In Bekins v. Raub, 40 Cal.App.2d 709 [105
P.2d 625], it was held that, after bonds are issued, there
is no right to call the assessment except to meet unpaid installments of principal and interest. Under no statute is
the assessment lien extinguished by discharge of the outstanding bonds, neither is there any provision by which a landowner may be compelled to pay the assessment. However,
section 3480 of the Political Code19 reads: "Any landowner
16

Now Wat. Code, §§ 51300-51302.
Now Wat. Code, § 51238.
18
Now Wat. Code, § 51420, supra.
19
Wat. Code, § 51651.

17
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of the district who shall desire at any time to lessen or remove the lien upon his land of any assessment on which
bonds have been or hereafter may be issued may deliver to
the county treasurer for cancellation any bonds payable out
of said assessment, and the treasurer shall credit against the
assessment on his land the principal and accrued interest.''
The purpose of the 1919 assessment was to provide for
the cost of a specific improvement. The integral relationship between the assessment, the bonds issued to pay for that
improvement, and the improvement itself was clearly recognized in Rohwer v. Gibson, 126 Cal.App. 707 [14 P.2d 1051].
In that ease, the court denied a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the levy of an additional assessment for the
purpose of paying delinquent installments upon outstanding
bonds. It was held that the statutory provisions specifying
the procedure for payment of the bonds were a limitation
upon the taxing power of the district. ''When the collection
of taxes has reached the value of the benefits conferred upon
the lands within the district, there is then no legal provision
for placing additional burdens. In other words, if under
such conditions the bonded indebtedness has not all been
paid, there exists no legal provision by means of which the
holders thereof may receive payment." (Pp. 713-714.)
[9] In the present situation, the taxing power will have
been fully exercised when the improvement, to finance which
the bonds were issued, has been paid for by the exaction of
taxes in the form of calls for bond payments. This eonelusion is strengthened by the language of those sections permitting the discharge of the lien of the assessment when outstanding bonds are surrendered. These sections clearly indicate a legislative intent to make the assessment eo-extensive
only with the collection of funds necessary to finance the
improvement for which the assessment was levied. Presumably, the bond issue of Reclamation District No. 1500 was
sufficient in amount to pay for the contemplated improvements for which the 1919 assessment was levied. Upon payment of the bonds, the assessment will have been fully discharged.
[10] The contention of the treasurer that the application
to bond payments of the money in controversy would be a gift
of public funds to a private person, in violation of section
31 of article IV of the Constitution, is entirely without merit.
Such money is not the property of the state or the district,
but is a part of a trust fund held for the benefit of the bond-
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holders. (River Farms Co. v. Gibson, supra.) Furthermore,
payment of the legal obligation of the landowners to the
bondholders is not a gift.
The county treasurer urges, however, that to permit a
discharge of the unpaid assessments will discriminate against
the landowners who have paid their assessments in full. Such
result, it is argued, would cause them to bear the greater
part of the cost of the improvement and deny to them equal
protection of the laws, due process of law, grant to some
landowners special privileges and immunities, and constitute
special legislation.
Under the applicable statutes, a landowner was given two
methods of discharging the lien of the assessment. He could
acquire outstanding bonds of a face value equal to the amount
of the assessment and, upon delivering them to the treasurer,
have the lien discharged. If he preferred to do so, he could
pay such calls as might be levied from time to time against
his property. Such were the terms of the contract which
the landowner accepted when the bonds were issued. Each
property owner had the choice of taking the course which
he deemed the more advisable. [11] ''The equality of the
Constitution is the equality of right, and not of enjoyment.
[12] A law that confers equal rights on all citizens of the state,
or subjects them to equal burdens, is an equal law. [Citations.] So long as the statute does not permit one to exercise
the privilege while refusing it to another of like qualifications, under like conditions and circumstances, it is unobjectionable upon this ground." (Watson v. Division of Motor
Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279, 284 [298 P. 481].)
[13] Even if there be no legal basis prohibiting the application of the excluded funds to payment of the bonds,
argues the county treasurer, a writ of mandate must be denied
to prevent an inequity.
That there is presently sufficient money to pay the outstanding bonds, without resort to calls on the assessment,
is a fact which results from the economic conditions of the
times. In the years immediately following the issuance of
the refunding bonds there was economic depression. During
that time, many landowners were unable to pay the calls of
the treasurer and their lands were sold for delinquencies.
Finding no bidders willing to pay the statutory upset price,
the treasurer was obligated to buy the lands for the bond
fund. By 1949, when the lands were sold, they had greatly
increased in value. The amount here in controversy repre-
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sents almost exclusively that increase in value. More accurately, that amount is an increment of the trust corpus
from which the landowners' obligation to the bondholders
was to be discharged. That all the landowners are not entitled to share in this fortuitous increase results from the
course each selected to discharge the lien of his assessment.
The depression conditions which influenced the prices of
land and the ability of property owners to pay calls also
were reflected in the value of outstanding bonds. It has been
stipulated that many property owners were able to buy bonds
at a substantial discount and apply them at face value against
the lien of their assessments. Because the bonds of latest
maturity could be purchased at the greatest discount, in the
main, those surrendered were of that class. As a result there
were fewer obligated landowners, thereby increasing the
proportionate amount necessary to be paid by the remainder
of them to meet the treasurer's calls to satisfy the currently
maturing bonds. The treasurer's purchases of delinquent
lands also increased the proportionate shares of the amounts
necessary to meet bond payments. In addition, they were
subjected to a 15 per cent charge over and above their shares
to cover possible delinquencies. (Pol. Code, § 3480.) 20
The course of action taken by each landowner was chosen
with these facts clearly apparent. Those electing to discharge their liens by surrendering bonds purchased at a
discount thought they were in a better position than the ones
who decided to pay the calls as they were made. The landowners taking the second alternative relied upon the chance
that the bond fund would be sufficient to meet all accruing
amounts of principal and interest. That they have benefited
by the exercise of business judgment which the law permitted
is of no legal consequence in this proceeding. Theirs was
the greater risk, and theirs was the greater gain.
[14] The record does not support the treasurer's contention that Sutter Basin Corporation has waived the right to
raise the constitutional question because its counsel appeared
before committees of both houses of the Legislature and advocated the adoption of the amendment to section 3480 here
in issue. The stipulation of facts shows that at no time did
he advocate the exclusion from the treasurer's estimates of
any money in the bond fund. He appeared in connection
with proposed procedure in regard to the sale of delinquent
lands.
""Now Wat. Code, § 51420.
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These considerations compel the conclusion that a retroactive application of the 1949 amendment would impair the
contract existing between the landowners and the bondholders.
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed.
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Gibson, C. J., dissented.
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur.
It is my opinion that the judgment herein follows necessarily
from the premise established by the many California cases
cited in the majority opinion that upon the issuance of bonds
by a reclamation district a contract is created between the
landowners of the district and the bondholders. Although
persuasive arguments can be made against the soundness of
this premise (see cases cited in 100 A.L.R. 164), it has become
a rule of property governing the rights and duties of landowners and bondholders under past bond issues. It does not
follow that the reasoning underlying the cases establishing
the rule must be applied to future bond issues. (See concurring opinion in Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal.2d 613, 623 [145 P.2d
312].) This court could provide a sound rule for the future
by declaring that although those cases govern past bond issues,
they are to be deemed overruled as applied to future bond
issues. (Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst oa & Refining
Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 [53 S.Ct. 145, 77 Ij.Ed. 360, 85 A.L.R.
254] ; People v. Ryan, 152 CaL 364, 369 [92 P. 853] ; People v.
Maughs, 149 Cal. 253, 263 [86 P. 187] .) A majority of this
court, however, appears unwilling to reexamine the earlier
cases at this time.
It bears noting that even though these cases are not overruled, the Legislature is free to provide that in future bond
issues the relationship between landowner and district is that
of sovereign and taxpayer and does not give the landowner
contractual rights. The relationship between district and
bondholder should of course remain contractual and the bondholder's rights free from impairment.
CARTER, ,J.-I dissent.
The premise on which the majority opmwn is based is,
that where bonds have been issued by a reclamation district
which arc secured by a special assessment levied upon the lands
in the district according to the benefits received, there is a
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contract between the bondholders and the landowners arising
out of the law existing at the time the bonds are issued which
cannot be changed, insofar as the landowner is concerned, by
subsequent legislation; that such a change occurred here by
reason of the amendment to Political Code, section 3480 (now
Wat. Code, § 51420) enacted in 1949, which required the
treasurer to exclude from the bond fund any monies therein
which were obtained from the sale and rental of lands, acquired by the district as the result of sales for delinquent
assessments, when he made his estimate of the amount of
the annual installment required to meet the unpaid assessment. It is held that such exclusion impaired the contract
between the bondholders and landowners in that it changes the
time and method of payment of the assessment and gives the
bondholders additional security because the landowner was
entitled to have the land sale and rental money used to pay
the bonds before he could be required to pay any installment
of the assessment.
It is conceded, as it necessarily must be, that the Legislature
has plenary power with regard to reclamation districts and
that the Legislature may change the law with respect to them
at will. " . . . [T]he Legislature shall have power to provide
for the supervision, regulation and conduct, in such manner
as it may determine, of the affairs of irrigation districts,
reclamation districts or drainage districts, organized or existing under any law of this State." (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 13.)
It necessarily follows that, as far as the landowners are concerned, there is no contract beil'ween the district and the landowners arising out of the statutes which existed when the
bonds were issued, because, if it were otherwise the Legislature
would not have the plenary power it does have over the affairs
of reclamation districts. The majority opinion states, however, that there is such a contract between the landowners and
the bondholders which cannot be impaired by a change in the
law, which is merely an indirect way of saying there is a
contract between the landowner and the district. Such a holding is contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority (100
A.L.R. 164), and the cases to the contrary in this state holding
that there is such a contract between the bondholders and
landowners should be overruled. In some of those cases it
has been so stated when the issue was whether the bondholders'
contract with the district had been impaired- whether their
rights could be lessened by subsequent legislation, not whether
the landowners' "rights" could be changed. (Islais Co. v.
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Matheson, 3 Cal.2d 657 l45 P.2d 326]; Copeland v. Raub,
86 Cal.App.2d 441 l97 P.2d 859]; River Farms Co. v. Gibson,
4 Cal.App.2d 731 [42 P.2d 95].) The other cases (County of
Los Angeles v. Rockhold, 3 Cal.2d 192 [44 P.2d 340, 100 .A.L.R.
149]; County of San Diego v. Childs, 217 Cal. 109 [17 P.2d
734]; Hershey v. Cole, 130 Cal.App. 683 [20 P.2d 972]) that
do hold that the landowner also has a contract right with the
bondholder to the continuance of the existing law are clearly
wrong. In the instant case the bondholders are not asserting
that the money received from the rental and sale of delinquent
lands must be considered in computing the annual assessment
installment. The landowner is asserting that claim against
the district and the legislative amendment to section 3680. He
may not do so because of the plenary power of the Legislature
over the taxes or assessments that the landowner may be required to pay.
While it is true that before the 1949 amendment to section
3680, the treasurer, in computing the annual assessment installment considered moneys already in the bond fund from
any proper source as being available to pay the installment.
'l'hat may be said to have been merely a method of arriving
at the amount of the installment in which the landowner has
no contract right because the basic assessment was made
against his land in a lump sum and that is his fundamental
liability.
Assuming there is a contract between the bondholders and
landowners which the latter may insist cannot be impaired
as against the district by any subsequent legislation, there
has been no impairment here, and even if there has been to
some extent, it may be justified under the police power.
The majority opinion states that the contract under section
3480 of the Political Code is that the bond fund was to
consist of all assessments and amounts collected from the
sale of delinquent lands, and such fund was to be used exclusively for the payment of bonds; that the treasurer shall annually estimate the amount of the installment on the assessment to be paid, and in making his computation, shall give
consideration to the amount then in that fund from any proper
source. It is the latter provision which was changed by the
1949 amendment to that section which provided that the
amount in the fund from the sale of lands should be excluded
in computing the annual assessment call. Such a change does
not constitute an impairment of the contract. The basic contract on the part of the landowner was an agreement to pay
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the entire assessment which was levied against his land, and
it has always been payable in installments of such amounts
and at such times as the board of directors of the district may
direct. (Pol. Code, § 3466; Wat. Code, § 51517.) The computation provision was merely a method of arriving at the
amount of an annual installment and did not purport to lessen
the amount of the assessment payable. It did not give the landowners an absolute right to have the assessment installments
computed in that way. It may have given them the right to
insist that the money in the fund be used to pay bonds, but
the time or method of the payment of the assessment was left
to the discretion of the board of directors of the district and
the Legislature. Indeed it may be that the method of computation of the installments was for the sole benefit of the
bondholders rather than the landowners. It fixes a procedure
which will assure the former of f~nds to pay their bonds and
interest coupons as they fall due rather than a limitation
on the amount of the installment that may be demanded.
It is also suggested that the bondholders are given greater
security by the 1949 amendment than they had before, that
is, an assessment call large enough in itself to pay principle
and interest without crediting the amount already in the bond
fund. The bondholders at all times had that security, because, by the terms of the bonds as set forth in the form of
bond contained in section 3480, the bonds were "based upon
and secured by the assessment levied on the lands.''
The Legislature could have reasonably concluded that if
there is some impairment of the contract it was justified under
its police power. It could reasonably determine that there
should be equity and fairness as between the landowners in
the district and that it would be inequitable for the landowner here involved to obtain a windfall by reason of the
money in the bond fund which was obtained from the sale
of delinquent lands-that is, by excluding such money, he
will not be excused from paying his assessment when the others
have paid theirs. The Legislature may have reasonably decided that the most equitable method to meet the condition
brought about by changing economic conditions was to require
the assessments to be paid in full, leaving the district with
surplus funds which will ultimately inure to the benefit of all
landowners in the district, rather than giving one landowner
a windfall. It is not a case of taking delinquent land sales
money from the landowners to their detriment. Those funds
still are held for the benefit of all of them. It is true that
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other owners have paid their assessments with bonds at their
face value, which they purchased at a price below that amount
during the depression, and hence benefited, but whether that
matches the windfall the instant landowner will receive or
whether it is better for the district to have the funds for the
benefit of all under the 1949 amendment, was properly a
matter of legislative determination. It should be noted that
the Legislature could also consider that any assessment installment now paid is with inflated money, but the amount
of the bond has not increased since the depression because
the amount payable on the bonds is fixed.
The essence of the majority opinion's position seems to be
that the landowners are entitled to have the bond fund exhausted and that source alone must first be used to pay the
bonds and hence the regular annual assessment cannot be collected. That is substantially the same as County of San Diego
v. Hamrnond, 6 Cal.2d 709 [59 P.2d 478, 105 A..L.R. 1155],
where legislation was passed after an assessment and bond
issue which was payable solely out of assessments against the
lands benefited, which authorized the county to pay the assessments out of a general tax levy. Some of the landowners,
who had paid all their assessments, urged that it would impair
their contract, under which the assessment was all they would
have to pay; that by their being subject to the general tax to
reduce assessments on landowners who had not paid their
assessments, their contract that the bonds would be paid only
by the assessments, was impaired. The court held it was not.
To the same effect see City of Dunsmuir v. Porter, 7 Cal.2d
269 [60 P.2d 836]. Likewise, in the instant case, petitioner's
contract has not been impaired because it was always liable
for the assessment and cannot insist that the bonds be payable
solely from funds derived from the sale and rental of delinquent lands. Petitioner is not being injured because, to
give it what it claims, would be a windfall, not something to
which it is entitled.
It is my view that the petition should be denied.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied March
16, 1953. Gibson, C. ,T., and Carter, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.

